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The aim of this paper is to highlight the specific logistics problems which Special
Operations Forces have, given their highly specialist nature and the factors that act
upon them such as external (political, economic and national culture) and internal
influences as well as the changing face of warfare. It will examine the ways in which
Special Operations Forces are currently supported logistically and will go on to
consider the ways by which commercial ‘best-practice’ could be used to enhance the
mission effectiveness of forces employed in this role.
Introduction
Special Operations Forces (SOF) or Special Forces have traditionally invoked a
degree of romantic heroism. The images of Lawrence of Arabia, David Stirling’s
Long-Range Desert Group, Merrill’s Marauders, Otto Skorzeny’s rescue of Mussolini
in 1943, and the SAS exploits with the Iranian Embassy and in the Persian Gulf War
(Bravo Two-Zero) have filled us with awe and wonder. While this has fostered an
ever-growing interest and body of literature around these sorts of forces and their
operations, such matters should really be viewed as belonging to the realm of
serious military operations rather than undercover romantic heroism that is the stuff
of films such as the James Bond series or True Lies.
2There are as many definitions of Special Operations as there are states that have
the forces to carry them out. Most share common elements though in that they are
operations that are more frequently influenced by considerations at a higher level
than usual, and require “oversight at the national level. Special Operations differ
from conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk”1, which
indicates a greater degree of political influence from national command authorities.
Typically, SOF are set apart from the rest of the armed forces and are considered
elite forces that are “specifically organised, trained and equipped to conduct or
support insurgency, sabotage, psychological, deception, counter-terrorist, foreign
assistance or commando-type operations”.2
Both SOF and the rest of the armed forces have had to come to terms with the end
of the Cold War, which has led to the contraction of defence budgets across much of
the globe, especially in respect to NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. This has
meant fewer resources with which to procure equipment and conduct operations and
many countries have downsized their armed forces and turned to streamlining the
logistic support given to those forces. In many cases this has led to a greater role for
third-party contractors. The military have examined the steps taken by commercial
companies in the past few decades in an attempt to find out if commercial ‘best-
practice’ can be applied to the logistic support for their armed forces and make
scarce resources stretch that much farther.
3Special Operations Forces
While many SOF have unique identities and histories, there are a number of
common threads that apply to most of them. A military elite is defined by three
criteria:3
• It must be perpetually assigned to special missions.
• It conducts missions requiring only a few highly trained personnel.
• They have a reputation for bravery and success.
There are four areas where SOF can be contrasted with other forces:
• The roles they are to undertake.
• The resources they are given with which to undertake their roles.
• The characteristics of the personnel assigned to these forces.
• The nature of the control exerted on these forces.
Most SOF declare that their roles are different from all others and this has to do with
political, cultural and historical factors more than military requirements, but the
majority of SOF roles can be fitted into one of three areas.4 The first area contains
the traditional combat missions, such as Special Reconnaissance in the enemy rear
and Offensive Action against targets of strategic or operational importance. It may
also include search and rescue of downed aircrew or isolated friendly forces (such
as the SAS operation to free members of the Royal Irish Regiment in Sierra Leone).
The second area has gained a new interest in many quarters, particularly the United
States, that of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) or Operations Other Than War (OOTW).
This term covers those conflicts that are generally between states or groups within a
4state and that are below the intensity associated with conventional conflict but above
the ‘normal’ peacetime routine. Such conflicts are generally localised ones, often in
the less developed regions of the world, but quite often have security implications.
SOF roles in this sort of conflict would include counter-insurgency (COIN) support
and influence (SI) to indigenous forces, combating organised crime, counter-
terrorism (CT) and psychological operations (PsyOps). The third area is in many
ways supplemental to LIC operations and that is ‘peace operations’ in support of
civilian authorities. This includes duties such as Close Protection Teams for VIPs
(CPT), negotiation team escorts, the arrest of persons indicted for war crimes
(PIFWC) and establishing relations in crisis areas. It must be remembered however
that there is considerable overlap between the three areas as many missions and
activities cannot always be neatly categorised.
Resource allocation is usually indicative of the political and military commitment to
SOF, and includes not only financial commitment but also the political commitment to
commit conventional forces to support SOF. Few nations have the resources to form
large SOF groups (in NATO parlance, a Task Force) that can carry out operations
with a high degree of self-sufficiency. In practice a Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) may be formed that can allocate scarce resources
and improve co-ordination.
Personnel within these organisations who carry out missions are usually called
Special Operators to distinguish themselves from those who support them. Such
individuals usually have a high degree of motivation to accept the risks involved and
are mainly volunteers although this is not a prerequisite. The character of an
5organisation can be defined by the career path for both enlisted men and officers
and it may be that all personnel have to return to their parent units after completing a
tour within the SOF.
Control of SOF can be decisive in determining its likely effectiveness, and also the
resources allocated to operations. They can be controlled centrally alongside other
state intelligence assets and agencies, or control can be devolved down to an
operational commander.
SOF can be categorised and divided into three models, based on their
characteristics, which correspond to the British, Russian and US SOF. The
Comprehensive Qualitative Model (CQM) represents the model followed by the
UK and is characterised by force of highly trained, but broadly skilled individuals with
a degree of central control, a high degree of political commitment, but are only
modestly resourced in comparison to other states. The Functional Quantitative
Model (FQM) represents the earliest development of such commando-style forces
and is a model still followed by the Russians. It is characterised by relatively large
numbers of personnel who are trained on a narrow base and controlled by a wide
variety of agencies. The Technical Functional Model (TFM) represents the course
taken by the United States and is characterised by relatively large numbers which
collectively cover a wide range of skills but are individually more narrowly trained
than the CQM. There is quite a strong-degree of central control and political
commitment but the size of the organisation (and the subsequent bureaucracy) is
often a source of inter-service rivalry.
6The SOF of the UK, USA and Russia and therefore the different models, are borne
out of different historical situations and development. The British SOF were created
during the darkest moments in World War Two and have remained small and
secretive with a high degree of political commitment but have lacked resources. This
has led to them becoming highly flexible, as they have had to expect a lack of
resources and have aimed to plan around that. The Russian SOF was born during
the Revolution and has remained a secret organisation with its base spread across
the state apparatus. They are relatively large, but lack somewhat in terms of
resources and are less protective of their personnel. The US SOF has finally come
out of its post-Vietnam depression and the failure of Operation Eagle Claw with the
relative successes of Operations Urgent Fury5 (despite some embarrassing
moments) and Just Cause6, and the highpoints of Operation Desert Shield / Storm
and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They have a strong influence, have strong
political commitment but represent a large bureaucracy.
In commercial terms, the UK SOF concentrate on their core competence of special
operations and outsource specialist functions and support to other parts of the UK
Armed Forces such as the Royal Signals, Royal Air Force or Army Air Corps. Other
assets are then contracted in as required, although this raises the possibility that the
third-party provider may have other priorities in conflict with those of the SOF. The
US SOF represents a large corporation that is vertically integrated with a large
number of shareholders. Whilst it controls its own assets, the shareholders often
disagree on company policy and it is in danger of assuming a monolithic corporate
ethos. Russian SOF could be seen as a gradually declining nationalised industry
with a proud past but faces a lack of resources and strategic drift. Its stakeholders
7tend to be very possessive about their part of the corporation and little enthusiasm to
become ‘lean’ and ‘agile’.
Factors Influencing the Way in which SOF Operate
SOF do not operate in a vacuum. They are subject to the external forces of politics,
economics and national culture (which is influenced by national history), internal
forces within the SOF themselves, and the changing nature of war in the modern
world.
One of the central influences on future SOF operations (and hence their demand for
logistic support) is the rapidly changing nature of war. The end of the Cold War and
the East-West balance has removed many of the old certainties and has meant an
increase in the opportunities for SOF to be used. Many armed forces are now
looking to answer the question, “who or what constitutes the threat?” It has been
argued that an increasingly grey area “ . . . where control has shifted from legitimate
governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers”7 is becoming the new threat.
Such organisations, forces or entities are likely to grow out of environments where
law and order is weak or non-existent, such as a failed state and it is possible that
these activities will be sponsored by pariah states in an environment that is part-war
and part-crime. The future of war is likely to the illegitimate child of Bosnia, Rwanda
and Somalia, rather than the son of Desert Storm.8
The previous symmetry of war (where two combatants fight it out on the same level
of intensity and bound by similar rules) no longer exists. Planning for traditional
8warfare was relatively easy (such as in planning for a Warsaw Pact assault against
Western Europe) but with the end of the Cold War and the traditional certainties
having been swept away, this area of uncertainty has created the greatest pressure
for both the regular armed forces and SOF to develop new methods of operation.
Figure 1 indicates the problems of warfighting in the post-Cold War era. If both
sides’ perceptions on the conflict, the risks involved and the intensity by which they
are going to wage it, are roughly similar the conflict is going to be roughly
symmetrical. This is shown by the central ‘corridor’ within the diagram, and conforms
to the traditional notions of low, medium and high intensity. If however their
perceptions are different then it is likely that asymmetrical conflict will take place. If
one’s own perception is too low, then there may be risks to the force involved in the
operation, as it has insufficient resources either in terms of combat capability, logistic
support or intelligence gathering (which is linked to the problems of multidimensional
warfare). If one’s own perception is greater then there is a risk of overreaction, of
using too great a force, and handing the opponent a political victory. In the new
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9post-Cold War era, SOF forces are most likely to operate in the areas either side of
the ‘corridor’ either in support of a conventional force or on their own. The tragic
events in New York on September 11 2001 have highlighted this and the impact
asymmetric warfare can have. The terrorists effectively circumvented the US North
American Air Defence (NORAD) network by hijacking internal domestic flights and
proceeded to use them as flying bombs, while the subsequent operations in
Afghanistan have featured the large-scale use of SOF.
A related concept to that of asymmetry is that of multidimensional warfare. Armed
forces have, for most of the last one hundred years, operated in the four dimensions
of the human senses9 but have increasingly sought to exploit the space that is
beyond the human senses, known as cyberspace.10 As an example, some of the
Somali warlords used a form of spatial warping against the US forces by moving
freely without bodyguards or protection. They effectively became stealthy by not
conforming to the US expectations of behaviour. The Americans did not expect such
a major leader such as Mohamed Aidid to move about among the population in
Mogadishu without escort and so was ‘beyond their senses’ even though he moved
in clear daylight. This is known as spatial expansion, while spatial contraction links
individuals via technology and so a major computer system can be attacked from
anywhere in the world by effectively shrinking space and time.
Armed forces are therefore increasingly faced by enemies who are not bound by the
norms of warfare and who are likely to blur the distinction between combatant and
non-combatant. With the demonstrations of combat power in both the Gulf War and
over Kosovo and Serbia, many smaller states are likely to realise that they cannot
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take on the might of either NATO or the United States in direct conflict and hope to
win and therefore they will most probably choose different methods of warfare with
which they might stand a better chance, such as economic warfare, terrorism, and
media manipulation. In the post-Cold War world, the large conventional and nuclear
forces that both East and West have built up may become increasingly impotent and
it will increasingly be the SOF that can counteract the new threats.
How those SOF are employed is defined by the state’s history. For example, the US
sees the SOF as guardians of the pioneering tradition in the footsteps of the
frontiersmen.11 France and Israel see SOF much more in the Machiavellian tradition
and any transgression of International Law would have to be extremely serious to
force them to act or apologise. The sinking of the Rainbow Warrior by French SOF
in Auckland Harbour only led to a minor apology.12
SOF will also be affected by external forces. These can be categorised as political,
economic and cultural:
• Political – As Clausewitz recognised long ago, it is “politics which beget war.
Politics represents the intelligence, war merely its instrument, not the other way
round. The only reasonable course in war is to subordinate the military viewpoint
to the political.”13 SOF are usually under tighter political control than the
remainder of the armed forces. This control often brings with it political pressures
that manifest themselves in, for example, trying to do more than they are
reasonably capable of doing for domestic political reasons. Operation Eagle
Claw14 for example, was an attempt to free the US diplomatic hostages held in
Tehran, Iran in 1980. While the President’s National Security Advisor persuaded
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Jimmy Carter it could work, the intelligence officer of Delta Force, Wade Ishimoto,
was less optimistic – “I didn’t think it had a chance of succeeding.”15 The mission
was aborted after a number of the US Marine Corps helicopters had developed
faults, which made the mission extremely risky, if not impossible. In the
withdrawal, 8 US personnel were killed when an RH-53D helicopter collided with
an MC-130 aircraft. Political demands for action had led to a mission that should
not have taken place, or have taken place with much greater planning,
preparation and care. Political pressures can place impossible demands or
impose intolerable constraints. The SOF will have to manage this reality as best
they can. SOF, as with most organisations, must adapt to the changing political
and strategic conditions of the time in order to maximise their chances for
operational success. It is important for the SOF that the politicians who have
ultimate political authority are educated consumers if the SOF are not to be
misused and face disaster, as is the case with the Brandenburgers16 and the
Spetsnaz in Grosny.
• Economics – economics and politics are interlinked, especially in Western
democracies where voters have a mandate on the performance of those in
Government. Since the end of the Cold War there has been pressure on the
defence budget to be reduced so the extra resources can be spent on other
areas of the public sector.17 This is especially so for SOF which are seen as a
‘gold-plated’ capability with their specialist training, equipment and increased
salaries.18 The pressure to demonstrate ‘value for money’ is especially acute, as
many of the SOF’s outputs can be hard to see, as they are indirect effects, or
have to remain classified. Initiatives such as Project Capital in the UK (which
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aims to encourage the reduction of asset holding by charging budget holders for
the depreciation of capital items) can undermine the ability of SOF to hold
equipment that is often obsolescent but may have utility in a certain scenario.
SOF may be forced to shed assets that they would otherwise liked to have kept,
but have been unable to accurately quantify to the satisfaction of the budget
holders.19
• Culture – National culture has a major impact on the way SOF works. The
controversy that followed Operation Flavius20 would have been a mystery in
France or Israel as the SOF are, in many ways, expected to operate as they did.
The American public is also rather suspicious of SOF operations, particularly in
the Vietnam era with the MACV-SOG and the Phoenix programme.21 Such
distrust can make the appropriation of much needed funds difficult. Culture also
has an impact on the attitude to technology and the aversion to casualties. A
society in which media focus can rapidly reduce political support will mean that
the political authorities will try to avoid casualties, not only in one’s own forces but
those of civilians and enemy soldiers as well.
The third group of factors that affect SOF operations are internal, and are again
categorised into political, economic and cultural:
• Cultural – The culture of any organisation can be characterised as its core
paradigm derived from the interaction of several factors that shape the nature of
the organisation. In the case of SOF, these can include the symbols or insignia
of the organisation (in the case of the SAS, the winged dagger22), the use of a
particular weapon (such as the M16A2 assault rifle instead of the SA80 in the
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case of the SAS), or the wearing of distinctive clothing (such as the SAS
windproof smock or the Green Beret for the US Special Forces). The
organisation itself is formally based on a traditional functional hierarchy similar to
many organisations. SOF however, tend to have a slightly different dimension,
which is based on the evolution of a process sometimes called the ‘Chinese
Parliament’23 where individuals can question the execution of the mission
regardless of their position in the hierarchy. This often manifests itself as a focus
on the mission and is based on experience, often leading to an NCO dominance,
rather than a functional focus, which is officer dominated. Too much of either will
have profound effects on the SOF’s performance. The final aspects of culture
relate to the history of the organisation and the rituals and routines that build up
over time.
• Politics and Economics – Politics and economics are bound up together and
the internal organisational dynamics of SOF will be to do with the decision
making process (who goes on what missions, who gets what equipment etc.).
Decision-making can be classified into two areas,24 logical-empirical decisions
(which are based on quantitative measures such as fiscal indicators) and
normative-effective decisions (based on qualitative measures such as instincts,
feelings and emotions). The decision to commit SOF to action are normally
normative-effective, as they are based around the complex political dynamics that
exist when that decision is taken. There is also the effect of personality, where
the personality type most likely to be found in SOF is likely to be the non-
repressive type, who tend to make more emotive and intuitive decisions than the
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repressive type (who are emotionally fragile and thus less likely to be able to
survive the long periods in a high-pressure environment).
In summary, SOF are like most other organisations in that they are subject to forces
both internal and external, and have to continually adapt to a changing environment,
all of which have an impact on their logistic strategy as shown in the above
diagram.25
SOF Logistics
The concept of the supply chain has entered general usage in the commercial
sector, and is steadily gaining credence in military circles, where it tends to be
referred to as the support chain. It describes the co-ordinated flow of information
and material between customers and suppliers from the emergence of a demand to
the final delivery of the wanted item or service. In military terms it would cover the
process from the initial procurement process to the final delivery to the front line
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user.26 Logistic competence in the supply chain is derived through the successful
co-ordination of network design, information handling, transportation, inventory and
warehousing, material handling and packaging.27 Figure 3 below shows how the
three key processes in the supply chain can be integrated through the flow of
inventory and information, inventory in this case being the ‘transformed input
resource’28.
This model can be applied to most profit and non-profit organisations, and in this
case, the support of SOF. Inbound logistics refers to the inputs with regard to
suppliers and is concerned with the procurement of inventory (both capital
equipment and consumables) as well as services to support operations, and could
be stretched to include the recruitment, selection and training of personnel. The
operations support area is concerned with those ‘value-adding’ activities that
increase the utility of the inventory to the final customer (the deployed SOF). These
can include modification of procured items or vehicles to suit operational conditions,
or configuring items for airdrop. The outbound logistics function is concerned with
the movement and receipt of items from the operations support area including the
setting up of the distribution system if the SOF are deployed.
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A generic SOF supply chain (based on the previous diagram) is shown in Figure 4:
The SOF distribution system is a network running from a Point of Embarkation
(POE), usually an airhead (APOE), through an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)29,
often outside the area of operations or even afloat30, through nodes to the deployed
SOF. SOF resupply and medical evacuation operations differ from conventional
forces as these are planned and executed as operational missions, as opposed to
being treated as logistic responsibilities. From the ISB, a Main Operating Base
(MOB) may be deployed, depending upon the size of the operation and the
geography of the area. If not, then the chain would go directly to a Forward
Operating Base (FOB) that would be sited quite near to the area of operations but
never in enemy territory. From the FOB, the SOF will deploy to the operational area
or perhaps an Advanced Operating Base (AOB). They will be resupplied by land,
through sea Distribution Points (DP) or Helicopter Landing Sites (HLS). Beyond the
FOB, logistic operations become an integral part of the combat operation.
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Information flows within the SOF supply chain link the logistics activities together into
an integrated whole. They contribute to the development of the most effective
logistic strategy to support deployed SOF whilst balancing the influences previously
mentioned. This integrated process builds on four levels of functionality:31
• Transactional – concerned with the basic initiation and recording of logistic
activities such receipts and issues.
• Management Control – concerned with the performance and reporting of the
system and uses measures such as financial cost, turn around time and quality
measurement.
• Decision Analysis – the level at which alternatives are considered depending on
the information coming from the lower two levels. It is geared towards process
improvement.
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• Strategic Planning – provides support to the development and refinement of
logistics strategy.
Inventory is input into the supply chain in order to reach the SOF, whether deployed
or not. SOF may source particular items through dedicated research and
development via funding from their own budget, or acquire items in common use
throughout the armed forces for reasons of commonality, economics, and simplicity.
Many of these items are often allocated centrally with the SOF being just another
user. Other items may be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) goods that are sourced
to meet a specific purpose, outside of the normal procurement procedures. The
items that are acquired, and are to be used in operations, will need to have a high
degree of reliability, be simple, inter-operable and be easy to maintain, as SOF often
operate in austere conditions and the high operational reliability requirement may
necessitate a larger than normal spare parts inventory.
The distribution (transport) system is the key to the SOF operations and is where
logistic support faces a stern challenge. It is not merely a support function but very
much a core aspect of special operations. A resupply mission is likely to have to
cross deep into enemy territory in a clandestine manner32 and is therefore in just as
much danger as the deployed unit. SOF will use any transport that they deem
appropriate, which could include fixed wing aircraft (such as the MC-130 Combat
Talon), rotary wing aircraft (such as the MH-53 Pave Low, CH-47 Chinook or MV-22
Osprey), fast jets dropping high speed containers (such as the A-21), land vehicles
(such as the UK’s Medium Support Vehicle (MSV)) and water transport (such as the
Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB) and submarines).
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SOF Logistic Requirements
The paper has looked at the factors influencing SOF operations and the structure of
the supply chains. It will now consider the logistics requirements it must meet in
order to be successful.
The logistic support imperatives for a SOF logistic system can be distilled into six key
areas:
• Self-sufficiency – it is of fundamental importance for the SOF logistic system to
allow the operation to be as self-sufficient as possible, and minimise the number
of resupply activities that may be needed.
• Demand pull – the nature of SOF missions means that traditional automatic
resupply (push) logistics is inappropriate due to the high-risk operations that SOF
undertake and just to mount a resupply mission deep into enemy territory on the
off-chance that the SOF may require resupply is unacceptable. SOF logistics
must therefore deliver what is required, when it is required and where it is
required. Commercially, this is known as Just-in-Time logistics. The only
difficulty in implementing this is that communications must be as near to 100
percent reliable as is possible and there must be a contingency plan in operation
in the event there is a communications failure.
• Operational security (OPSEC)33 – this is a key factor, particularly so given that
the changing nature of warfare means that the exact character and identity of the
enemy may (initially) be unclear. Any logistics strategy and structure must take
this into account and cannot compromise it. This means that sourcing must be
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carried out with care and vendors should be closely examined so that mission
security is not breached. Careless sourcing has the potential to endanger the
lives of those personnel carrying out the mission (as it may with any military
operation) and so the exact location of the operating bases should be concealed
when making delivery, even in a friendly and benign environment, somewhat
problematic.
• Freedom of action – as logistic drag can severely affect Special Operations,
logistic requirements must provide the minimum constraints upon an operation
and so the logistic system should avoid the over-insurance that occurs in a ‘Just
In Case’ inventory system. This is particularly so for those operations which
require agility. This has to be balanced against the need for self-sufficiency to
avoid over-loading men34 and vehicles35. This need to minimise logistic drag has
to be traded off against the need not to restrict options due to the unavailability of
supplies or equipment36. It is a difficult balance to achieve and a stern test of a
logistician.
• Interoperability – with regard to SOF, interoperability (the ability of systems,
units and forces to operate together in order to accomplish the given objective)
operates on two levels. The first is the national level; Special Operations rarely
happen in isolation (although that may change) and usually occur as part of a
larger Joint Force and to minimise delay, the SOF will use the existing in-theatre
logistic system. This can be made harder when equipment is not completely
interoperable. For example, some European SOF prefer to use the American
M16A2 assault rifle, which cannot fire the UK manufactured SS109 5.56mm
round as effectively as the US manufactured M193 5.56mm round. Conversely,
some European small arms, for example, the British SA80 assault rifle, cannot
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fire the M193 as effectively, although the US M16A2s have been upgraded so
that they can fire either the SS109 or M193 round equally well. Therefore UK
SOF have to bring in additional stocks of US manufactured 5.56mm ammunition,
rather than draw on ammunition supplies from other UK forces.37 As another
example, the US Air Force MH-53J Pave Low helicopters (used to support
Special Operations) have become so specialised with various upgrades that they
have only a limited commonality with other US Air Force HH-53 or US Marine
Corps CH-53 helicopters, which were all based on the same airframe. The
second is the international level. The changing nature of war and how it is to be
fought means that Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) are more likely
to be required to operate together, although some ‘de facto’ interoperability exists
as many alliance partners have to buy US equipment as they do not have the
resources to develop indigenous equipment themselves. This has already
occurred with the US PRC-137 HF radio being in widespread use across NATO.
• Accountability – with regard to SOF, accountability is in both financial and
political terms. Logistic systems are used to create a proper audit trail to try and
minimise waste and maximise value for money. The UK has set up the Defence
Logistics Organisation (DLO) and introduced Resource Accounting and
Budgeting (RAB), putting a greater emphasis on ‘lean logistics’ and a reduction in
the amount of stores and supplies held in inventories. Political accountability is
just as important however, with SOF operations receiving a great deal of attention
and sometimes becoming involved in legal proceedings. The logistic system
should maintain visibility of assets not only during the operation but for sometime
afterwards as well.
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Meeting the Challenge of SOF Logistics
Having looked at the factors influencing SOF operations, how their supply chains are
made up and the requirements it must meet in order to be successful, the paper will
now put forward an approach (and in doing so develop a hypothesis) to solving the
problems of logistics support to SOF, utilising case study examples of SOF activities
and logistic support.
The risk of failure in an operation increases according to the scale of the operation,
the nature of the role the SOF are undertaking and the type of SOF being used.
There are three operational scales, Task Unit (individual elements or teams, vehicles
or aircraft – unlikely to be used alone), Task Group (made up from Task Units and is
self-sufficient in terms of insertion and extraction assets) and Task Force (made up
from Task Groups). The first stage in putting together the approach, involves
constructing a hypothesis. Firstly, we will assume that the level of risk to an
operation from logistic failure increases as the scale of the operation increases (see
Figure 6).
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The nature of the role was highlighted earlier, and was split into ‘traditional’, ‘low
intensity’ or ‘operations other than war’ and ‘peace operations’. The second part of
the hypothesis stipulates that the level of risk associated from logistic failure
increases as the nature of the role changes (see Figure 7).
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Thirdly, as SOF generally fit into three models (as highlighted earlier) the hypothesis
will stipulate that depending on what model the SOF fits, this will have an impact on
the level of risk associated with logistic failure (see Figure 8).
These three aspects can then be combined into a 3D-cube model, which could
provide a means to differentiate the different logistics strategies that would be
appropriate for any operation based on scale, role and model of SOF. From that, a
specific logistics strategy for a given operation could be derived using Best
Commercial Practice to ensure efficient and effective support.
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This 3D model could be read as:
Figure 9. Combination of Risk Impact
Matrices in SOF Support Model
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The testing of the assumption that lies behind the hypothesis involved the selection
of some thirty-two case studies that were drawn from a wide variety of historical
contexts in terms of model, scale and role. The cases were selected on the basis
that:
• They represented an extraordinary logistic challenge, such as the Israeli raid
on Entebbe in 1976, codenamed Operation Jonathan.
• They provided a powerful contribution to a larger operation, such as Operation
Prelim, the UK SOF attack on Pebble Island during the Falklands Conflict of
1982.
• They proved to be a major operation in their own right, such as the attempt to
extract US PoWs from Son Tay in North Vietnam in 1970, codenamed
Operation Kingpin.
• They were representative of a particular role, such as the rescue of BAT21
(as dramatised in the film starring Gene Hackman) in Vietnam in 1972.
• They were representative of the SOF model, such as the Spetsnaz operations
in Levant-Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War in 1937.
• They were of a particular strategic significance, such as the rescue of Benito
Mussolini by Otto Skorzeny and his Commandos from Gran Sasso in 1943.
Each case study was examined in order to produce an assessment of the logistic
risk taking and logistic impact of mission decisions. Each case study was then
examined against two sets of criteria, the first being what the likelihood was of a
failure in the support chain and the second was what the impact was (or would have
been) of a failure of the support chain. Such factors that were considered in the
case of the impact of failure were the degree of specialisation, mission key
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equipment, the inability to adapt to logistical failure, system redundancy and back up,
and spare resources. With regard to risk minimisation, those factors that could
mitigate the risk of logistic failure included ability to repair, logistic planning, support
chain analysis, ability to resupply, the overall importance of personnel as regards the
ability to evacuate casualties and with reference to the previous category, the
provision of medical support. These factors had been based on an initial
examination of a number of case studies where logistics had clearly proved to be a
deciding factor in one of two ways. Firstly, where logistics clearly had a contribution
to the success or failure of the mission, and secondly, how well the logistic support
was carried out. Each factor was given a numerical value, and the mean taken,
resulting in two values for each study. In terms of the impact of logistic failure, a high
value would indicate that it had a seriously detrimental affect on the operation, while
for the likelihood of failure, a low value would mean that the risks had not been
sufficiently minimised through forward planning, establishment of the proper logistic
capability etc. These values were then plotted on a graph, the x-axis representing
logistic impact, while the y-axis represented risk minimisation.
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Figure 11. Chart of Case Study Data
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The next stage consisted of interpreting the results with regard to the three main
determinants, that of scale, role and model.
Task
Unit Task
Group
Task
Force
Figure 12. Case Study Results
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The original hypothesis put the Task Unit (the lowest level of operation) in the low
risk / low impact quadrant because it was thought that lower force levels would
create fewer logistic problems and as it would be possible to achieve a higher
degree of self-sufficiency, a failure in the logistic chain would have a lower impact.
While this seems reasonable given the data, the rest of that part of the hypothesis,
i.e. that as the level of the operation increased so did the risk and impact of logistic
support chain failure, was not quite so clear. Task Group operations seem to
confirm this but the Task Force operations seem to be at a lower risk of failure than
anticipated. It is probable that only those countries (such as the USA and Russia)
that have a large, well-developed capability can mount operations such as these and
that they have adequate resources to properly support, and therefore minimise, the
risk of logistic support failure.
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The hypothesis suggested that as operations moved away from peace through ever
more intensive (and dangerous) operational situations that the risk and impact of
logistic failure would increase. Analysis of the case studies seems to bear out these
prepositions.
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The hypothesis stated that the Functional Quantitative (FQM) or Russian model
would be low risk and low impact as there is a lower level of technology generally
and that standard issue equipment tends to be used which limits the logistic burden.
FQM operations rarely operate above the Task Group level38 and FQM SOF have a
limited range of roles compared to other SOF and so can standardise logistic
procedures more easily. The Technical Functional (TFM) or US model was felt to
be at the high risk / high impact quadrant as the use of high technology generates
equipment support issues and the wider variety of roles means a wide variety of
equipment which increases the logistic burden. The operations tend to be larger with
a wider range of specialised equipment and the increased reliance on technology will
increase the impact of logistic failure. The Comprehensive Qualitative (CQM) or
UK model was thought to sit between the two extremes.
The case studies did support the general ordering of the models and the data is
consistent with the hypothesis in terms of the impact of logistic failure. However, the
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Figure 15. Comparison of Case Study Results
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data differed in the degree of risk minimisation within the models. There is a slightly
higher degree of risk in relation to the FQM model and somewhat lower in relation to
the TFM, so while the impact of logistic failure is still markedly different, the risks
involved are broadly similar (although the TFM is slightly lower). This trend appears
to originate in firstly, the increased emphasis in force protection39 in Western Armed
Forces that may mean that the most complex and risky operations are not carried
out at all. Secondly, the aversion to casualties means that TFM operations will
involve extended planning and over-insurance with regard to logistics and so be very
slow to respond to contingencies.40 Thirdly, the FQM may be distorted by operations
such as Chechnya where the Spetsnaz have been used as little more than elite
infantry in inappropriate roles. The poor state of Russian logistics is unlikely to help
matters.
Overall, most of the tenets of the hypothesis were upheld, with the data being
inconclusive as regards the degree of risk minimisation in relation to the model of
SOF employed. In summary:
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Deciding the Allocation of Resources for SOF Operations
Having analysed the validity of the hypothesis through the application of data derived
from case studies, how can this be applied to the problem of logistics support to
SOF? Looking back, the paper has previously referred to the necessity of a logistic
system being able to respond to these imperatives:
• Self-sufficiency – wherever possible, SOF should be self-sufficient in order to
reduce the need for resupply and reduce the possibility of the mission being
compromised. There is of course a finite weight that a soldier can carry (even a
member of the SOF) without reducing performance.41 Reducing weight requires
investment in lighter weight alternatives that are usually more expensive than
their normal counterparts as they often require research into new materials. This
obviously will have an impact on the budget allocated to the SOF. There may be
fewer opportunities to reduce the unit cost as the high initial price will make the
item less attractive to the rest of the armed forces (and even the civilian market if
applicable) and therefore the supply of such equipment will be less attractive to
potential manufacturers. It is therefore unlikely that buyers of this equipment will
be able to benefit from economies of scale.
• Demand Pull – in order to reduce the inventory held by a deployed SOF that has
a finite capacity to carry what it needs with it (and therefore achieve self-
sufficiency) the philosophy of Just-in-Time (JIT) could be applied to the logistics
support of SOF. Items would only be delivered as and when they are needed.
This has a number of implications for logistic support. There must be sufficient
depth and breadth of items held within the support chain to meet SOF
requirements, and these will necessarily have a short lead-time. There must be
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a secure method of communicating the requirement up the supply chain and the
distribution system must be able to deliver items into what may be hostile territory
without compromising the operation. This has a significant impact upon the
inventory, storage and distribution requirements of the logistic system. Such a
system will need investment in order to guarantee that it has the requisite
responsiveness and inventory does, after all, represent money that is tied up.
Storage requires investment in facilities that will hold items and reduce the
chances of that item deteriorating whilst the distribution system will need
investment to achieve the capability of penetrating enemy territory undetected.42
• Operational Security (OPSEC) – this is paramount to special operations and
any logistics system must take account of this requirement. This has implications
in that firstly, items may have to held a long time in storage as sourcing on an ‘as
required’ basis may breach OPSEC and compromise the operation.43 Secondly,
visibility of inventory can be a problem in conditions of high OPSEC, so safety
stock may have to be held to take account of instances where deliveries cannot
get through.44
• Freedom of Action – this refers to both giving the commander flexibility through
having the necessary inventory available as well as not constraining them
through logistic drag. This can often be a difficult balance to achieve.
• Interoperability – being able to operate and be logistically compatible with other
nations as well as the rest of the country’s armed forces can help the logistician
through economies of scale and availability of spare parts, consumables and
equipment. They can however, be difficult to achieve simultaneously to any great
degree, as there is always going to be an element of differentiation in national
procurement for geographic, strategic and political reasons. There has been a
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degree of standardisation in NATO SOF around the use of the M16A2 and the
Heckler & Koch MP5. These items are not standard issue within the UK military
however, and so create a problem when the UK SOF are deployed with the
remainder of the armed forces.
• Accountability – this is a problem facing Western SOF more than other nations
in both political and financial terms. Political accountability is concerned with the
legality of certain operations and the logistic system is closely tied up with the
preservation of evidence and the visibility of equipment (to make sure that has
been used correctly and achieving value for money if nothing else). There is
pressure for this not only on operational deployments but during peacetime
training as well, where accident inquiries can require the same degree of
accountability as found on operations. The pressure since the end of the Cold
War to reduce defence budgets has meant that SOF are even more accountable
for their expenditure and it often falls to the logistic system to control costs.
It is now pertinent to examine how the hypothesis outlined earlier, can help in
resolving these often competing demands. Resources are finite for the armed forces
as a whole, and SOF are seen by many parties as a luxury item and so SOF must be
seen to make the most effective use of the resources given to them if they are to
receive continued political and financial commitment. All logistic systems have the
objective of providing all their customers with the level of service they require but
finite budgets mean that priorities have to be set.45 In commercial terms, this means
that recognition is given to the fact that not all customers are equally profitable and
so the highest service is given to those key customers and key products.46 However,
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the profit motive is difficult and inappropriate to translate to the allocation of
resources to SOF.
It should therefore be possible to differentiate on the basis of the factors used earlier
in the hypothesis. Resources could be allocated against the factors of risk and
impact, rather than profit and volume. The SOF support model can be used to
decide upon the allocation of resources based on the logistic analysis of the nature
of the operation, in particular the role and scale. The aim of this would be to derive a
solution to the conflicting demands upon the SOF and decide how best practice can
be used most effectively to improve the allocation of resources.
Logistic Strategies: Balancing Risk and Impact
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Figure 18. Matrix showing risk and impact
considerations for logistic strategies
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The simple matrix shown suggests how the balance between risk and impact can be
used to suggest alternate logistic strategies. It could be summarised in a three
dimensional model shown above.
Having looked at the possibility of differentiated strategies, the paper will now
analyse how these strategies could be implemented and what commercial ‘best
practice’ can offer in improving effectiveness. It will now examine each broad area in
turn and discuss how a logistic strategy could develop.
The area of high-risk, high impact operations (where there is a high risk of failure
and a high degree of impact following such a failure) is what can be considered the
core competence of SOF. Activities in this area are crucial to the execution of a
mission and are by definition the most difficult to carry out. The SOF support model
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suggests that it is the traditional activities carried out at the Task Group level or
higher by Western model SOF that fall within this area. The SOF logistic
imperatives are of key importance here and logistic resources must be concentrated
accordingly. As this area is a core competence for SOF, the application of
commercial best practice would suggest that outsourcing47 these activities would not
be beneficial for the following reasons:
• Loss of control over support activity
• Potential OPSEC breach
• Lack of visibility
• Reduction in flexibility
• Operational risk
If one considers that this area above all others is at the core of the SOF’s business,
then what should the strategy encompass? The key elements to any strategy are
information, inventory, storage and transport and distribution.
• Information – information flows are the links that turn logistic activities into an
integrated process and work at all levels from the simple transactional level to the
strategic planning level. Any strategy in the high-risk, high-impact area should
address firstly, that communications are vital to all levels of an operation. At the
transactional level, communications enable the effective execution of
transactional logistics and it is vital to the operation of the logistic imperatives, in
particular the need for demand pull. Communications systems must have an
element of redundancy, in addition to procedures in place in case the systems
fail. Secondly, visibility48 is vital to allow effective use of scarce resources and to
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allow redirection where necessary.49 This visibility needs to take account of the
concerns of OPSEC and be consistent with the desire for self-sufficiency. Thirdly,
planning input is vital. Resupply of SOF is not a routine administrative activity but
a mission in itself. Logistic information input is vital to ensure that the minimum
number of missions are carried out to reduce the potential for breaches of
OPSEC. The key to logistics planning is the formulation of contingency plans to
cover such situations as lost communications.
• Inventory – as the transformed input resource inventory represents the 'fuel' of
the SOF engine and the key capital cost items of any operation, the central
imperative in this case is self-sufficiency. The sourcing of items within an
appropriate lead-time must be balanced against the desire to be completely self-
sufficient. This balance needs to ensure that there is a mission duration stock of
SOF particular items that may be held at various points in the supply chain.
These items should be held in an allocation consistent with the ability of the Task
Group or Force to transport it within an acceptable time. Alongside this, there is
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a requirement for the visibility of common user items that might be held in the
system and the capability to divert part of those stocks to SOF. Central to this
would be the maintenance of a safety stock to account for differences in time
between demand and supply. Routine items, which are sometimes termed MRO
(maintenance, repair and operating) items, are not as capital intensive and have
minimal OPSEC implications. These items can be sourced widely with some
safety stock consistent with local availability. In times of poor local availability,
these stocks will be of a higher level with storage and accountability implications.
• Storage - the storage of inventory items can be of considerable importance. The
larger communication requirement means that SOF support locations generate a
considerable amount of transmission radiation, which is sometimes inconsistent
with the storage of key inventory items such as guided missiles, which require
Radio Frequency (RF) overpacks to shield key electronic components. As the
amount of these communications increases so does the requirement for
shielding. Storage areas must be sufficiently close to meet the lead-time
requirement and be secure. SOF peculiar items also need considerable security,
not only because it can indicate their presence, but also because these items are
often nearly impossible to replace in a short space of time.
• Transport and Distribution - the ability to move inventory is vital to the
operation of the SOF logistics system and its capability dictates where and how a
large proportion of the inventory can be held. The difficulty in forward storage,
and often limited transport capacity, dictates that the further up the supply chain
these items are held, the better. By holding inventory ‘upstream’, there is greater
flexibility to redirect it to the point of need. Key to having this ability is a rapid and
flexible transport system under the direct control of the SOF that cannot be
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redirected outside of the SOF chain without the acquiescence of the SOF itself.
The US SOF has considerable air assets available to it through the 1st Special
Operations Wing (SOW) which is committed to SOCOM exclusively, whilst UK
SOF at present, relies upon earmarked aircraft from Nos. 7 and 47 Squadrons,
RAF which are at the moment, theoretically outside of the SOF Commander's
exclusive control.
Within this high risk, high impact area, the transport system must be able to
effectively infiltrate and exfiltrate the environment encountered during the execution
of these operations. It is insufficient merely to earmark aircraft, for the aircrew need
to be properly trained as well.
The high risk, low impact area encompasses those operations in which the risk of
failure of the logistics system is relatively high but there is in fact a likelihood of a
limited impact of that failure. Analysis of the case studies indicated that few missions
fell within this area but those that did were of a low level and generally related to the
Figure 21. Matrix showing high risk and high
impact area.
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Functional Quantitative Model. Technology levels were generally lower and there
was often scope to be supported by much larger formations. To be effective in this
area, the logistics system requires the following characteristics:
• Inventory levels can afford to be much lower and stocks can be reduced to
minimal levels as the impact of the system failing is much less.
• Communications systems can be less comprehensive although contingency
systems (and plans) are still required.
• Transport remains important, but parts of it can be outsourced to an outside
provider as long as set levels of performance are met. This might mean a rear
link operated by the Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) of which SOF are
just another user, with dedicated assets concentrated on operations in a more
hostile environment.
• As inventory is reduced, the storage requirement decreases and use could be
made of shared facilities to free up SOF assets elsewhere.
• Logistic planning is still required but can be more transactional in nature with
perhaps less flexibility due to the reduced impact of the logistic plan failing.
Figure 22. Matrix showing high risk and low
impact area.
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The low risk, high impact area is characterised by a higher level of operations that
are commonly associated with low intensity conflict and carried out by predominantly
Western style SOF. The high technology levels, combined with the diverse nature of
the operations, makes the impact of logistic failure extremely high. Balanced against
this is the risk minimisation benefits accrued through higher levels of training and
commitment of the appropriate resources. To be effective the logistics system
requires the following:
• Inventory levels need a degree of safety stock, as the impact of failure is high but
a narrower range of items is likely to be required as there is a greater capacity to
use common user items due to lower level of risk.
• A communications system that must be interoperable with conventional logistics
systems to allow stock visibility.
• OPSEC must be preserved and should not be compromised for visibility.
• There should be a core transport capability, although additional elements can be
called on from outside as required.
Figure 23. Matrix showing low risk and high
impact area.
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• Logistic planning input is more important due to the high impact of logistics
failure. Logistic planning requires full integration into the overall plan.
The final area to be considered is the low risk, low impact area. It is the area with
the greatest scope for simplification and cost reduction, in order to strengthen the
capability in other areas. The characteristics of this area are as follows:
• Inventory should be operated on a just-in-time basis. There should be minimal
safety stocks procured and use should be made of local sourcing and commercial
carriers to reduce necessary inventory levels.
• Communications should have commercial back-up systems to reduce costs.
• Transport should be acquired on and 'as required' basis from commercial sources
with a limited core of operational vehicles.
• Storage requirements should be minimised and use made of hire facilities
whenever possible.
• Logistics planning should be simplified, and rely on local purchase and the use of
procurement cards to reduce logistics staff effort wherever possible.
Figure 24. Matrix showing low risk and low
impact area.
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Having looked at the strategies that can be derived from the application of a
differentiation methodology such as the SOF Support Matrix, the final area the paper
will examine is how best practice could be applied to improve these areas.
Best Practice to Improve Logistic Performance
Five key areas of best practice that characterised the improvement of the supply
chain have been identified50:
• Function to process - traditional organisations have been functional in design
with each function having a clearly identified task. Best practice suggests that a
cross-functional approach, with what was earlier termed mission focus, can
produce better results. The idea must be to integrate logistics fully within the
mission and not use it as a 'bolt on' extra at the end.
• Profit to performance - the growth of such systems as Resource Accounting
and Budgeting is supposed to be output based and not cost based, as it was in
the past. Whilst there is suspicion that the attempts to identify true costs are
another way of cutting costs, the theory remains sound with a focus on output
rather than cash input. Performance of a logistics system needs to be based on
its performance and not its cost. SOF systems in particular, need to be
recognised as having the requirement to meet the logistic imperatives and cannot
be easily compared with other systems. Performance measurement of SOF
systems need to take a holistic view of where they fit into the overall mission and
not just crudely compared with other military systems.
• Product to customer - the development of a customer-supplier relationship
within the SOF organisation is a useful way of identifying the stakeholders in
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logistic decision-making. With a firm customer focus rather than an obsession
with its internal functional workings, logistics systems are better able to effectively
target resources. The other side of this is the realisation that elements of SOF are
required to be intelligent customers if they are to get the best out of the logistics
system. Requirements need be specific and unambiguous to avoid any
unnecessary over-insurance.
• Inventory to information - over-insurance through extensive inventory can be
replaced through the better management of information. Replicated equipment
can be replaced by more efficient distribution of smaller stocks and resources
switched to the point of logistics vulnerability when required.
• Transaction to relationships - there needs to be an establishment of a set of
clear relationships between SOF and its support, and a move away from simple
transactional relationships. Its core capabilities must be fully integrated into the
organisation and those elements that are outsourced need to be closely aligned
to the SOF mission focus. Resources allocated to SOF for specific missions
should come from elements well versed in the requirements of SOF and should
have an established relationship with that organisation.
Summary
This paper has considered the role and purpose of special operations, which was
drawn from a variety of sources. The key points were that Special Operations:
• Have a high political and military imperative
• Require specially trained and equipped forces
• Operate in an environment usually containing high political and military risk
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• Require high levels of military and political commitment to succeed
From this, it has proposed that Special Operations Forces are not a homogeneous
entity but can be broadly distilled into three general models:
• Functional Quantitative Model (Russia)
• Comprehensive Qualitative Model (UK)
• Technical Functional Model (USA)
The paper highlighted the fact that SOF are under a wide variety of pressures, both
internal and external, and how such organisations cope with these. Any logistics
strategy needs to take this into account. These pressures, combined with logistics
theory enable a set of logistic imperatives to be produced. In effect, these define the
challenge of logistic support to SOF. These imperatives were:
• Self-sufficiency
• Demand pull
• Operational security
• Freedom of action
• Interoperability
• Accountability
In order to resolve this problem, a hypothesis was formulated that postulated that
there was a link between the risk of logistic failure and the impact of that failure in
terms of:
• The scale of the operation
• The role being undertaken
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• The model of SOF being followed
A number of case studies were utilised to test the hypothesis. Whilst the case
studies utilised could not be conclusive, it was broadly indicated that there was a link
between these factors. The solution to the problem is grounded in the need for the
differentiation of strategy to ensure effective targeting of logistic resources. Different
strategies for different areas of risk and impact indicate the optimum approach to
balance cost effectiveness against operational success. These are summarised
below.
Taking into account the key imperatives listed earlier it can be seen that, to be
effective in the area of high-risk, high-impact operations, the logistic system must
include:
• Levels of inventory consistent with the communication and transport capability of
the force;
• Asset visibility with real-time transmission of demand with system redundancy51;
• Dedicated high-speed transport capability52 that is appropriate to the operating
environment53;
• Storage requirements recognising different climatic scenarios;
• Integration of logistic needs with communication systems.
High-risk, low-impact operations encompass those operations where the risk of
failure of the logistic system is relatively high, but there is limited impact from such
failure. Key points are that:
• Inventory levels can afford to be much lower than other operations;
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• Communications system may be less comprehensive (but contingency systems
are still required);
• Transport is important but could potentially be outsourced;
• Storage requirement is reduced.
Low-risk, high-impact scenarios is an area traditionally carried out by
predominantly Western-style SOF. To be effective, the logistics system requires the
following characteristics:
• Inventory levels must have a degree of safety stocks, although only a range of
items is likely to be required;
• Stock visibility must be permitted through communications systems that can use
conventional logistics systems – operational security must be preserved, not
compromised due to logistic visibility;
• There is a need for a core transport capability;
• Logistic planning input requires full-integration into the overall plan.
Low-risk, low impact operations are where there is the greatest scope for
simplification and cost reduction in order to strengthen the capability in other areas.
Characteristics include:
• Inventory could be operated on a just-in-time basis with use made of local
sourcing and commercial carriers to reduce inventory levels;
• Communications should have commercial back-up systems to reduce costs;
• Transport could be supplemented on an as-required basis from commercial hire-
sources;
• Storage requirements should be minimised;
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• Logistic planning should be simplified, for example using local purchase or
procurement card.
These logistic strategies can be summarised in the diagram below:
Future Support to Special Operations Forces
Before concluding, the paper will briefly look at how each of the logistic imperatives
could be influenced by the development of technology.
• Self-sufficiency - improvements in self-sufficiency could be achieved through
demand reduction technology. At the individual level, there are several key
developments. Nanoscience54 technologies can reduce the weight of ballistic
protection devices in addition to the production of ultra-light weight alternatives to
existing equipment. Biomimetrics55 could enable the replication of food from local
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Figure 25. Matrix showing risk and impact
considerations for logistic strategies.
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materials and vegetation and so reduce the food load for long-range operations,
whilst technologies such as nutrition patches will allow individual endurance to
improve. Sleep management techniques and technologies, such as those
pioneered by B-2 Spirit crews when conducting missions over Serbia from the
continental United States (CONUS) could enable individual soldiers to stay
awake for over 72 hours without loss of performance.56 Sports technologies that
pioneered the improvement of athletic performance can also improve fitness
levels of SOF and so increase the ability to manage the loads that are required
for a self-sufficient operation. A key area for technological development is that of
power management, particularly for communications devices, all of which are
extremely demanding on available resources. Future developments, such as self-
generation, through routine movements such as walking, and micro fuel cells, can
all reduce the combat load of SOF without loss of capability.
• OPSEC - the preservation of OPSEC can be enhanced through the development
of stealth / masking technologies57, which can conceal logistic support assets,
both visually and electronically. The ability to communicate effectively worldwide
can also enable wide dispersal of assets, with no loss of co-ordination and
control.
• Demand pull - the need for demand pull requires effective communication
throughout the system. The growth of global ICT (Information and
Communications Technology) associated with such areas as the Internet and
mobile communications, enables effective global communications. When
combined with rapid transport systems that are capable of penetrating hostile
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airspace, such as the MV-22 Osprey, cargo carrying unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV)58, stand-off precision air drops59 and cargo carrying cruise missiles60, the
risk to aircraft and air crew can be greatly reduced.
• Freedom of action - the ability to have complete visibility of support assets
across a whole force can enable effective logistics input to the operational plan
and enable the commander to have clearly-defined freedom of action.
Development of multi-role equipment through modular production techniques
allowing simple component exchange for additional capabilities61 and could
reduce overall equipment requirements and so reduce logistic drag.
• Interoperability - the increased cost of research and development of new
technology means that many programmes are collaborative, with the additional
result of that there is often ‘de facto’ interoperability. Most SOF technology is
driven by the United States, one of the few nations to be able to afford large-
scale SOF technology development. The dominant position of the United States
in the area of air assets, means that NATO SOF must be able to operate with US
technology, such as the ‘HAVE QUICK’ transmission modes.62 Technology
enables standardisation through portals, that have developed commercially, to
link new and legacy systems.
• Accountability - the need for accountability, for legal and political reasons, is
enabled through the adaptation of technologies developed by law enforcement
agencies, such as forensics and video technology. ICT allows better visibility
than ever before, with technology such as bar coding and radio frequency
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technology improving the ability of the logistic system to stand up to any form of
post-action scrutiny.
Conclusion
Special Operations Forces are not homogeneous and have developed due to a
variety of influences, both internal and external. As a strategic asset, SOF are
closely influenced by the politics of the nation and by the economic and cultural
forces that define it. These external factors themselves can define the internal
influences by dictating resources and roles. These influences often represent
strengths such as the capability to operate claudestinely but also represent a source
of weakness to the organisation. The ability to operate independently can create a
culture of distrust of outside agencies that can lead to inefficiencies. It is important
that any support strategy understands the influences that the SOF is under, both
internally and externally.
There is a common framework in commercial logistics that is equally applicable to
SOF logistics. The principles of the supply chain or support network with its
elements of inventory, information etc. are just as relevant to SOF as to a
commercial organisation. The application of commercial concepts, cannot however,
be prescriptive and it must be recognised that there are different performance
parameters to be considered. A commercial organisation is driven by satisfying
stakeholders’ expectations, which is generally manifested in financial terms. SOF
stakeholders also require satisfaction, but this is rarely expressed in pure financial
terms and is generally more intangible.
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SOF support is based on the concept of risk management.63 Special Operations
balance the benefits of success against the risks of failure and this balance is the
key to operational planning. The logistics strategy influences the scale of risk and
ultimately the chance of success and so the performance of the system should be
measured in terms of risk and impact over the usual financial indicators used in the
management of a logistics system. The case studies support this view, with logistic
failure considerations having a key role in several of the missions.
Any SOF support strategy must take the logistic imperatives into account if it is to
effectively manage risk whilst attempting to efficiently manage resources. The
logistic imperatives represent the factors that must be balanced to meet stakeholder
requirements in the provision of support. They can be contradictory and so a
compromise between the factors must be made to produce the most effective
approach. Balancing these factors represents a ‘trade-off’ between the operational
imperatives, which are demanding of resources, and the financial imperative, which
aims to minimise expenditure.
The study of historical data can provide useful insights in order to evaluate the
validity of a hypothesis. The interpretation of this data is essentially qualitative and
requires skills of a historian rather than a statistician. However once a common
approach to the study of the historical data is established, it becomes apparent that
many historical principles are equally applicable even if clothed in different
terminology, despite differences in specific detail. It is these general principles,
which take account of the environment in which the events are set which are of
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value. It is meaningless to compare directly for example, Soviet operations in Levant
in 1937 with Operation Desert Storm, but what can be undertaken is setting each in
their historical context to derive the degree of prominence attached to logistics
support for that operation. This cannot be done prescriptively, but needs to take
account of the specific situation as it existed.
Having established that a degree of differentiation between scale, role and model
exists, differentiated strategies can be formulated based on risk and impact
management decisions using commercial best practice where applicable to derive
key principles that can balance the logistic imperatives. The key must be to apply
commercial logistics principles carefully in the context of each situation and not
merely adopt commercial practice prescriptively. A strategy of differentiation is
necessary to effectively target resources where they are required most.
The SOF Support Model can be used to inform the risk management decision-
making by placing logistic plans into an appropriate context of risk and impact. By
identifying areas of high risk and impact, logistics resources can be targeted towards
the area where they would be of greatest benefit. In each differentiated area, a
different balance of the logistic imperatives has to be found that enables a greater or
lesser degree of commercial involvement depending upon the situation.
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